

SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONCEPT “JUSTICE”

Abdulazizova Sevara Ganiyevna

Teacher of the department of the theoretical aspects of the English language Andijan State Institute of Foreign Languages. tel.: +998934427780

ANNOTATION

Concept is a mental representation or an abstract idea that we use to understand and organize the world around us. It is a general notion that summarizes and simplifies complex information or experiences, making it easier to communicate and process. For example, the concept of “love” is an abstract idea that represents a range of emotions and behaviors that people experience in their relationships with others. Similarly, the concept of “justice” represents a set of principles and standards that guide our sense of fairness and equality.

KEYWORDS: *concept, unit, consciousness, linguistic expression, cultural specifics, implementations, justice, abstractness, mental framework, phenomenon, loyalty, democracy, social justice, communicate.*

Introduction

A concept is a unit of collective knowledge / consciousness (sending to the highest spiritual values), which has a linguistic expression and is marked by linguistic and cultural specifics. This is a culturally marked verbalized meaning, presented in terms of expression by a number of its implementations. The concept belongs to the national linguistic consciousness. Concepts are semantic formations high degree abstractness.

The purpose of a concept is to provide a mental framework or idea that helps us understand a particular topic or phenomenon. Concepts can range from simple ideas like “honesty” or “loyalty” to more complex ideas like “democracy” or “social justice.”

Concepts allow us to classify, organize, and analyze information, making it easier to understand and communicate. They also help us identify patterns, similarities, and differences between different ideas or things.

There are several characteristics of a concept, including:

Abstractness: A concept is an abstract idea that represents a class of objects, events, or phenomena. It is a mental construct that does not have a physical existence.

Generalization: A concept represents a general idea that applies to a broad range of situations, objects, or events. It helps to identify commonalities among various things or phenomena.

Mental Representation: A concept is a mental representation of an idea that we use to understand the world around us.

Clarity: A concept should be clearly defined and understandable, so that others can comprehend it.

Universality: A concept is universal and can be applied across different domains or contexts.

Coherence: A concept should be logically consistent and coherent, so that it can be used to make sense of information and solve problems.

<https://cejsr.academicjournal.io>

Relevance: A concept should be relevant to the context in which it is used, and should have practical applications.

Flexibility: A concept should be flexible enough to accommodate changes in our understanding of the world, and to adapt to new situations and contexts.

Abstraction: A concept is an abstraction, meaning that it represents a simplified version of reality that is easier to understand and manipulate.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We used a complex method of analysis, including:

- 1) method of semantic analysis involves the analysis of cultural values of concepts;
- 2) descriptive method comprises monitoring and classification of the material;
- 3) comparative analysis identifies the universal and distinctive features of concepts in unrelated languages;

One of the first domestic representatives in the study of concepts is S.A. Askoldov. He defines the concept as “a mental formation that replaces for us in the process of thought an indefinite set of objects of the same kind”.

N.D. Arutyunova considers the concept as a concept of practical (everyday) philosophy, which is the result of the interaction of a number of factors, such as national tradition, life experience, religion, ideology, folklore, images of art, sensations and a system of values. Concepts form "a kind of cultural layer mediating between man and the world".

D.S. Likhachev in his work “The Conceptosphere of the Russian Language” says that the concept is the result of a collision of the dictionary meaning of a word with a person’s personal folk experience.

This idea is close to Yu.S. Stepanov, who says that “the concept is, as it were, a clot of culture in the mind of a person; something in the form of which culture enters the mental world of man”.

The approval of the concept of the concept in linguistics marked a new stage in comprehending the patterns, methods and features of the interaction of language, culture and consciousness, as well as new aspects of the interaction of linguistics, cultural studies, philosophy, cognitive science.

In the linguistic literature, the term "concept" is considered to be defined in different ways, so there are many definitions of this term.

The concept has its own structure. A concept can be either a separate meaning or a whole conceptual structure that includes other concepts and sets other levels of abstraction. In terms of content and degree of abstraction, A.P. Babushkin subdivides concepts into several types: 1) concrete-sensual image, 2) scheme, 3) concept, 4) prototype, 5) frame, 6) scenario (scripts), 7) gestalt, etc.

Specifically - a sensual image is an image of a specific object or phenomenon in our minds.

A concept higher in terms of the degree of abstractness is a representation (a mental picture in some classifications) - these are generalized sensory images of various objects and phenomena. The representation reflects the totality of the most visual, external signs object or phenomenon.

Schemes are concepts represented by generalized spatial-graphic images (“river” as a blue ribbon).

A concept is a concept that contains the most general, essential features of an object or phenomenon, its objective, logically constructed characteristics. The concept arises on the basis of a representation or scheme as a result of gradual abstraction from secondary features.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

<https://cejssr.academicjournal.io>

Justice is, for the most part, what we think it is. Although thinking may seem to take a back seat to emotion in the turmoil of reactions to injustice, or to simple habit in the everyday enactment of just behavior, it is nevertheless true that features of our social environment can be partitioned as “just” or “unjust” only because we can think about them. With this idea as the guiding assumption, this chapter introduces a distinction between two principal ways in which the social world impinges on the person's thoughts. First, just as the person might look *at* a distant light, the person may *befocally aware* of a social entity such as a person or a group. Second, just as the person might look *through* a telescope at the light, the person may be *tacitly aware* of social entities. This distinction makes it possible to characterize the person's social awareness both in terms of what is focal (what social object is being thought about) and in terms of what is tacit.

Perceptions of justice are based fundamentally on attributions of cause and responsibility. Whether one focuses on the person on the street, the subject in a research setting, the social theorist, or the philosopher, justice perceptions are grounded in these attributions. Their crucial importance can be observed by noting the following: (1) differences between individuals' perceptions of justice are based on differing attributions of cause and responsibility, attributional conflicts; (2) an individual's perception of justice will change as a consequence of changes in these attributions; and (3) individuals asked to describe and explain their justice perceptions search for attributional information and base their explanations on appeals to such information. Attempts by social psychologists to understand lay perceptions of justice are often forced to invoke implicit assumptions about causal and responsibility beliefs. Important philosophical disagreements on the nature of justice rest in a fundamental way on differing assessments of the extent to which persons can be held morally responsible for their characteristics and actions in a given context and social structure.

Concepts, such as justice and injustice, lend themselves easily to a discussion at the abstract theoretical and philosophical level without appearing to require recourse to the world of mundane data. Yet, these concepts certainly should not remain isolated from relevant areas of empirical inquiry in psychology. This article discusses some of the points of contact between concepts of justice and existing theory and data concerning conformity to group norms, one of the traditional areas of research in social psychology. Conformity to social norms can determine the nature of one's response to injustice, including the appropriateness of potential ways of reducing it. Reactions to injustice carry the serious potential danger of disrupting the social system if left entirely to the individual's discretion—or to collective action unchecked by societal norms.

The term prosocial behavior refers to acts that benefit others. This domain includes behaviors, such as donating to charity, sharing, helping others with small tasks, and intervening in emergencies. The label prosocial is a rough description of a group of externally similar behaviors that may stem from qualitatively different motives. In the study of prosocial behavior, three areas seem particularly relevant to considerations of equity and justice—sharing and distributing resources, compensatory helping, and reciprocity. A substantial amount of research indicates that people may behave prosocially to maintain equity and justice in interpersonal relations. The relationship between prosocial behavior, equity, and justice is far from perfect. Prosocial behavior may produce inequities; and inequities may be redressed through antisocial behavior and psychological advices.

Cognitive layers that reflect the development of the concept, its relationship with other concepts, are formed by conceptual features and complement the basic cognitive layer. The combination of the base layer and additional cognitive features and layers make up the scope of the

<https://cejsr.academicjournal.io>

concept and determine its structure. Thus, the basic cognitive layer with a sensory-figurative core is an obligatory component of any concept, and numerous cognitive layers in the structure of the concept may be absent.

The purpose of conceptual analysis is "to reveal the paradigm of culturally significant concepts and describe their concept sphere". The object of the study is the meanings conveyed by individual words, grammatical categories or texts, while attracting a large corpus of contexts for the use of the word in fiction allows not only to describe the concept under consideration, but also to structure it, isolating a set of the most characteristic features.

CONCLUSION

A concept is a linguo-philosophical unit that was introduced thanks to an anthropocentric approach in linguistics. A concept defines and groups almost every possible meaning of any given word and their development.

A concept is a semantic unit that has linguo-cultural features and characterizes speakers of any chosen ethno culture. While reflecting an ethnic mindset, a concept marks the ethnic language world image and serves as the so-called brick to build "the house of our being."

A concept is a unit that preserves and proceeds information about reality. It is an ethno cultural group of words and a basic mental phenomenon that expresses the natives' cognitive consciousness. A concept is a small unit of an ideal consciousness and experience of native speakers.

REFERENCES:

1. Blouw, Peter; Solodkin, Eugene; Thagard, Paul; Eliasmith, Chris (2016). "Concepts as Semantic Pointers: A Framework and Computational Model". *Cognitive Science*.
2. David Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 2 (3).
3. Georgij Yu. Somov (2010). Concepts and Senses in Visual Art: Through the example of analysis of some works by Bruegel the Elder.
4. Goguen, Joseph (2005). "What is a Concept?". *Conceptual Structures: Common Semantics for Sharing Knowledge. Lecture Notes in Computer Science*.
5. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7902237>
6. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7902231>
7. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8068010>